Editorial

6 June 1992

LAND-BASED THINKING

If you ask a hundred college graduates what great battle of World War II was fought on June 6, the few that could answer will name D-Day, June 6, 1944, on which the Allies established a beachhead on Normandy, breaching Adolf Hitler's Fortress Europe and initiating the end of his "Thousand-Year Reich." D-Day, however, is only a correct answer. Equally correct would be the Battle of Midway, which was just as crucial to the outcome of World War II.

Fifty years ago today, the Americans, with 27 surface fighting ships against the 87 of the Japanese, won an overwhelming victory: they sank four aircraft carriers while losing one, destroyed over 300 planes while losing 37, and inflicted 2,500 casualties while sustaining 307.

The real victory was strategic. Japanese expansion to the east was stopped; Japan's loss of its naval air force meant that it could never again take the offensive as it had in the first months of the war. In the words of historian Gordon W. Prange: "At Midway, the United States laid aside the shield and picked up the sword, and through all the engagements to follow, never again yielded the strategic offensive."

It is tempting to blame the "Western-oriented" educational system for the fact that many more people associate June 6 with Normandy rather than with Midway. We wonder, however, if it is as simple a matter as stressing an event that took place in Europe over one that took place in the Asia-Pacific region.

One could plausibly suggest that we, being land-based creatures, almost never think of what happens on the high seas. It was not until Alfred Thayer Mahan came along that people started thinking seriously about the influence of sea power on history. It should therefore come as no surprise that when historians write their chronicles of various wars, they usually stress the land battles over the sea battles.

We are so land-based in our thinking that we recall naval engagements only when there are no corresponding land battles -- as when we remember Augustus Caesar beating Marc Antony and Cleopatra at Actium, the Christians defeating the Turks at Lepanto, the British (with an assist from Mother Nature) sinking much of Philip II's Spanish Armada, or Commodore George Dewey destroying the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay.

Otherwise, the land battles take precedence. In the Persian Wars, for instance, we are far more likely to recall Miltiades at Marathon, Leonidas at Thermopylae or Pausanias at Plataea rather than Themistocles at the sea battle at Salamis.

We remember Washington's victory over Cornwallis at Yorktown, but too often forget that the British had to surrender because the French fleet under De Grasse prevented them from escaping by sea. In the Napoleonic Wars, we are more likely to remember the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo than Admiral Horatio Nelson at Trafalgar.

Closer to home and to our own era, we remember Gen. Douglas MacArthur wading ashore at Leyte, but completely forget the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the biggest naval battle of all time. We even remember Bataan and Corregidor more than Leyte Gulf.

Our land-based thinking extends to many areas -- even to such matters as the problems of our overseas contract workers. We pay far more attention to our women who serve as domestics in foreign lands than to our men who work as sailors on ships flying the flags of other lands.

We are so land-based in our thinking that we remember our generals but forget our admirals. We are perfectly willing to accept retired generals as ambassadors, cabinet members and even presidents. Retired admirals? We apparently regard them as only good enough to run the Postal Services Office or the Philippine Ports Authority.